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Because trade liberalization which is anticipated to be tempora.:ry creates a
divergence between the effective domestic rate of interest and the world rate
of interest, tariff reduction in the presence of international financial asset
trade may reduce welfare for a small country.

Calvo has argued that even

though the government intends to liberalize trade pennanently, if the private
sector believes with some probability that a tariff will be imposed in the
future, then free trade may not be optimal.

This paper first fonnalizes this

argument and discusses the optimal policy for a government which seeks to
maximize representative household welfare.

'Ihe government's lack of

credibility is represented by a set of beliefs the private sector holds about
the type of government it faces.

Next, beliefs are endogenized by allowing the

private sector to update them using Bayes' rule.

In one approach, the true

government's objective is maximize welfare for the economy, so that it does not
seek to imitate another type, in contrast with other recent models of policy
credibility.

With learning, the government eventually adopts free trade,- even

though restricted trade is optimal initially.

We would like to thank Phil Brock, Michael Jones and Willem Buiter for
useful comments.

1.

Introductio n
Trade liberalizat ion which is anticipated to be temporary creates a

difference between the effective domestic rate of interest and the world rate
of interest.

In some recent papers, Calvo (1985, 1986b) has demonstrate d the

second-best result that temporary trade liberalizat ion, even in the absence of
market power or distortions , may reduce welfare for a small col.ID.try.

(Froot

Because a tariff will be reimposed in

(1986) demonstrate s a similar result.)

the future, there is an intertempo ral distortion when financial assets can be
traded internation ally which may dominate the welfare-inc reasing effects of
temporary tariff reduction.
In another paper,

Calvo

(1986a)

has

argued that

even though

the

government intends to liberalize trade permanently , if the private sector
believes with some probability that a tariff will be imposed in the future,
then free trade may not be optimal.

Calvo takes the beliefs of the private

sector as given exogenously .
In this paper we first fonnalize Calvo's argument and discuss the optimal
policy for a government which seeks to maximize a representat ive household's
welfare.

The government 's lack of credibility with the private sector is

represented by a set of beliefs which the household holds about the type of
government it faces.

The households perceive the possibility of two types of

governments , one of which is ·the true one.

We assume that there is a single

false type, which is believed to select a tariff with a positive probability .

1

Households choose their constunption and saving plans to maximize expected
utility, where the expectation is taken over the policies of the two types of
governments, given their prior beliefs about the probabilities of which type
they face.

The true government also maximizes household expected utility;

however, it knows its type, so that · the expectation is taken using this
information.
their

Because

The government would ideally always choose free trade.

policy

objectives

are

incredible,

tariff

(i.e.,

imposition

non-liberaliza tion) may lead to a higher level of household utility than free
trade.
We next endogenize learning by allowing the private sector to update its
beliefs using Bayes' rule.

Our

approach is somewhat similar to that taken by

Backus and Driffill (1985,1986), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Barro (1986) in
their

analyses

However,

of monetary policy.

in

our

model

the

true

government's objective is to maximize welfare for the economy rather than some
Furthermore, the true government does not increase its

arbitrary flll1ction.

payoff by imitating another type -- our equilibrium is not the Kreps-Wilson
repu1:.ational type.

The true government's payoff is greater the larger is the

probability perceived by the private. sector that they face the true type.
In the presence of learning,

weaker.

Calvo's case· for non-liberaliza tion is much

If a government is cormnitted to maximizing welfare, then we show

first that with learning, the private sector must be more skeptical initially
(than without learning) for a tariff to be superior to free trade.

show that there is

a.11

We also

upper botmd on the number of periods in which a tariff

will be chosen by the welfare maximizing government.
Section 2 presents a simple two-period model with a single consumption
good.

Calvo's argument is developed in the absence of learning.
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Learning

about the governme nt's type is introduce d. in section 3.

In the single
Section 4

consumab le model, there are no atempora l effects of trade policy.

The

adds a second consumpti on good and a static welfare gain from free trade.

Section 5 conclude s.

model is also extended beyond two time periods.

2.

A Two-Perio d Model Without Learning

The effects of private sector incredib ility about the objective s of the
simple two-peric xi model of a

governme nt are introduce d in a
economy.

small open

There is a single imported consumpt ion good, which is not produced

at home, and an export good (manna) which is not used domestic ally and is
available in an exogenou sly fixed supply each period.
represent ed by a

The private sector is

single household which maximizes the expectati on of a

discounte d sum of utility of current consumpt ion.

The discount rate is

constant and equal to the world rate of interest.
The governme nt's only role is to set trade policy and redistrib ute any
The governme nt seeks to maximize the

tariff revenue in a lump-sum fashion.
welfare of the

However

represen tative household .

credibili ty with the

private

sector:

the

the

governme nt

household believes

lacks

that

the

governme nt is the true welfare-m aximizing one with positive probabil ity less

than lll1ity.

For simplicit y, we assume that the household believes the only

alternati ve possibili ty is a governme nt which adopts the rule:

impose a

tariff next period with probabil ity q, or choose free trade for the next
period with probabili ty (1-q).
Because

we

will. introduce

learning
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by

the

household

about

the

government's true type, we restrict the policies which can be chosen in any
period to a finite set.

Otherwise, if the government selects a policy which

has zero probability of being chosen by the alternative government, then the

government's type will be fully revealed.

For simplicity only two policies

are assumed to be available -- free trade or a fixed positive tariff rate.
Furthennore, taxes on foreign borrowing or capital controls are unavailable
(see below) •
The export good is chosen as numeraire.

The representative household's

utility is given by:

where c

1

and c

2

are consumption in periods 1 and 2, respectively.

V(c) is

twice continously differentiable, increasing and concave and Pis the discom1t
factor.

V' (c) approaches infinity as consumption falls to zero and approaches

zero as consumption rises toward infinity.

The expectation is taken over the

beliefs of the household about the government's type and respective behavior
in period 2.
The household has access to an international capital market, in which it
can borrow or lend at given rate of interest, r.

Any debt incurred in period

We assume that the household's rate of

1 nrust be repaid in full in period 2.

discmmt equals the world rate of interest, so that P = ( l+r)

-1

•

Units for

the importables and exportables are chosen so that their free trade price is
l.lllity and the relative price of the import in terms of the export cum tariff
is p

> 1.
The household solves
~

c ,x,c ,c2
2
1

{V(c ) + P[1l'V(c2 ) + (1-n)V(c 2 )]}
1

4

subject to

pc2

s y - (l+r)x+R.z,

c

and

2

:S

y - (l+r)x,

where n is the subjective probability that the tariff will be imposed in
period 2, p

1

is the relative price of the import good in period 1,

~

R _and ..

1

R are the lump-sum transfers of period 1 and period 2 tariff revenue,
2

respectively.
is given by

c2

If p

1

is one, then R is zero.
1

Planned consumption in period 2

in the event a tariff is imposed in the second period and by c 2

in the event of free trade in the second period.

The first period current

account deficit is given by x, and y is the amount of manna available each
period.
The household equilibrium conditions are:

(1)

(2)

c

1

+ c /(l+r) = y(l + 1/(l+r)), and
2

(3)

The equilibrium conditions R

1

=

(p -l)c and R
2
1
1

=

(p-l)c

2

have been used in

the second and third equations.
The government chooses trade policy in each period to maximize household
welfare, which is expected utility.

However, the government knows its true

type, so that its objective function is

In the second period, the true government is indifferent between free trade
and a tariff because there is no static tariff distortion in this special

5

model.

There

are

only

intertemporal

distortions

in

the

presence

of

international asset trading induced by the government's lack of credibility.
We will assume that the true government always chooses free trade in period 2,
because this choice would always be optimal in the last period for a small
country if there were multiple consumption goods.

The subjective probability

that the tariff is imposed in period 2, n, is the product of the probability
that the false government imposes the tariff, q, and the perceived probability
that the government is the false type, (1-l).
The true government's problem is to choose p, from the set {1, p} to
maximize the value of W, given the resultant expected utility maximizing
Equation ( 1) implies that if

constnnption behavior of the househol9-.

11

exceeds

zero and free trade is selected in the fi°rst period, then consumption in
period 1 exceeds y and consumption in period 2 is less than y.

That is, the

country borrows from abroad since the effective market rate of interest faced
by the household is less than the world rate of interest.
is zero, then free trade in the first period (p1 = 1) achieves the
first-best allocation of consumption over periods, and if ff is unity then the
If

ff

tariff achieves the first-best.

In both these cases, the intertemporal terms

of trade for the household are identical to the foreign terms, (l+r), so that
there is no intertemporal distortion and consumption is the same in each
period.

When n is· between zero and one, there is a welfare loss due to the

intertemporal distortion created by the government's lack of credibility tmder
either free trade of the tariff.
In this model, any policy which brings the effective rate of interest for
households into equality with the world rate of interest eliminates the
intertemporal distortion and achieves the first-best outcome.
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One such policy

is an intennedi ate tariff which yields a domestic relative price of the
importabl e between one and p.

However, our motivatio n is the problem of trade

liberaliz ation when the private sector is skeptical about the governme nt's
resolve to stay with the liberal regime.
probabil ity

ff

If the private sector assesses

to a return to the old status quo and probabil ity

1-ff

that

whatever liberaliz ed regime is chosen will be maintaine d, then our set-up is a
simple

represent ation of

the

optimizin g governme nt's

problem.

The

two

possibil ities perceived by household s are simply normalize d to yield relative
prices,

1 or p.

Therefore ,

we exclude

the

possibil ity that

the

true

governme nt can select a tariff rate other than one of the two rates the false
governme nt might select.
Other policies which alleviate the intertemp oral distortio n are capital
controls, as noted by Calvo (1985).
foreign

borrowing

(lending)

An optimal policy is to impose a tax on

along

with

consumpt ion is just equal across periods.

free

trade

(tariff),

so

In the presence of a

that
static

distortio n under a tariff (substitu tion in productio n or const.nnpt ion), free
trade and a tax on foreign borrowing of the appropria te magnitude can achieve
a first-bes t allocatio n.

capital

controls

are

For the remainder of this paper, we assume that

infeasibl e,

or

that

taxes

on

internati onal

asset

transacti ons can be evaded.
The governmen t chooses between free trade and the tariff to maximize
household utility, cognizan t of how the household subseque ntly consumes and
saves.

The value of social welfare in the case of free trade in the absence

of learning is given by a function of the househol d's prior beliefs, n:

(4)
such that
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(5)

(6)

c

+ (l+r)

1

-1c

2

= y(l

= ff(l/p) +

f>

+ (l+r)

-1 ), where

(1-11).

is the ratio of the world market discount factor to the

'Ih.e ftmetion ,p

domestic effective discount factor and is always less than or equal to one.

w1 (ff)
in

achieves a maximum for

1t.

1t

equal to zero and is monotonically decreasing

To see this, note that differentiation of equations ( 4) , ( 5) and ( 6)

yields:

Equation (5) implies that V' (c ) < V' (c ), so that, with strict concavity of

1

V(c), dW Jdn < 0, for all

1t

1

2

>O.

Social welfare when the tariff is imposed is given by:

(7)
such that
(8)

(9)

c

where p

~

p · ,p

~

1.

+ (l+r) -1c 2 = y(l + (l+r) -1 ),

1

W (ff)

p

monotonically increasing in

achieves a maximum when n equals one and is
ff.

This is derived from differentiation of

equations (7) , (8) ·and ( 9) which yield

Since in this case (8) implies that V' (c )
1

> V'

(c ), dWP/dn
2

> O,

for all n<l.

'Ih.e values of social welfare are depicted in Figure 1 for both the free

trade and tariff cases.
greater than one-half.

The value of

11,

ff *, such that the two are equal is

To see this, first note that since the rate of time

8

preference equals the interest rate, and utility is concave, the farther c
c

2

deviate from c

1

= c 2 = y,

the lower is social welfare.

chosen in the first period by the government, c
while c

2

1

or

1

When free trade is

> y and there is dissaving,

< y. Let us call the choice of consumption in the first period under

free trade c', and the choice of consumption in the second period under free
(first

period)

trade

(1/2)(1+(1/p))V' (c*).
y and 02

C

*•

From the

first

order

conditions,

When a tariff is chosen in the first period, then c

> y. Note that if c* were consumed

=

V' (c' )

1

<

in the first period, and c' were

constnned in the second period, that the first-order conditions would not be
satisfied.

It

would

be

the

case

that

V' (c*)

(1/4) (l+p) (1+(1/p) )V' (c *) because ( l+p) ( 1+(1/p)) (1/4)

< (1/2)(1+p)V' (c')

>

1.

=

Therefore, it is

the case that the first period consumption is less than c* (because utility is
concave, a lower first-period consumption is needed to achieve the first-order
condition) • Hence, when the tariff is imposed at n = 1/2, the consumption
bundle is farther from the optimum and welfare is lower.

> Wp

Thus at n = 1/2,

w1

and the intersection must occur to the right of one-half.

I;f

the private

sector's

beliefs

in

period

1 are

that

the

joint

probability of the government being false and imposing a tariff in period 2 is
greater than rr *, then the true optimizing government will impose a tariff in
the first period.

Otherwise, free trade in the first period will be optimal.

In the case that q is less than one-half, free trade will be optimal in period

1 for all prior subjective probabilities that the government is the true type.
Example:

Let utility display constant relative risk aversion with the

·coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to two:
-1

V(c) = -c

9

.

Ii>

= -----, where p is the
{p + 1
domestic price-ctm1-tariff of the constuna.ble.
and for all ff

For all

ri

> 11 *'

< ff *, w1 (ff) > Wp('").

3. Two-Period, Single Consumable Model with Learning
I

We now introduce learning by the private sector about the government's

type

using

Bayes' Rule.

The household updates its beliefs about the type of

government given the observation that if the government is the true one, it

has acted optimally in the first period.

The updating rules given that free

trade or a tariff is optimal for the true government are straightforward.

We

asstnne that the government knows the household's prior beliefs and that the
household recognizes that the true government chooses between the tariff and
free

trade optimally given the posteriors

that will be

formed by the

household.
If the parameters of the economy are such that a tariff is optimal for
the first period, t..hen t..he prior probability that a tariff is imposed in
period 1 is given by

where .:t is the prior probability that the government is the true type.
0
prior comes from the facts

that true government chooses a

This

tariff with

probability one (because we are talking about the case in which a tariff is
optimal) and the false government chooses a tariff with probability q (it has
the same probability of choosing a tariff in period 1 and period 2) • Using
Bayes' rule, the posterior that the government is the true one once it is
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revealed that there is a tariff in place in period 1 is

Therefore, the posterior n, the subjective probability that a tariff will be
~posed in period 2, in this case is

where

'"o

was

the prior probability of a tariff in period 2 (the subjective

probability of a tariff in period 2 before the tariff in period 1 was revealed

=

q(t-:t )).
0

This is because the probability that the true government will

impose a tariff in the second period is zero, while the probability that the
false one will is q,
In other words, households know what the true government would do if it
were in power.

They know the parameters of the model, so they know if a

tariff is the optimal choice by the true government if it is in power,
this case it is optimal to put on a tariff,

In

Prior to observing the tariff

that is actually chosen by the true government J households have some prior
probability that the true government is in power.

After it is revealed that a

they update their priors.

Consumption

decisions are made in period 1 after the tariff is revealed.

Because the

tariff is imposed in period 1,

(true) government has full information, they make their tariff choice in
period 1 lrnowing how consl.Ilners will update their priors.
If the :r;arameters of the economy are such that free trade is optimal in
period 1, then the prior probability that free trade will be observed is

The posterior probability that the government is the true one, after having
observed free trade in period 1 is

11

,..

Therefore, the posterior

the subjective probability of a

1r,

tariff being

imposed in period 2, in this case is

< n 0 < q,

For O

-

both n

A

1

and n

1

Note that i

are less than n •
0

1

A
~ 1r

1

for a

given prior n , as long as l exceeds zero.
0
0

~

There will be a prior n , call it n, that gives rise to posteriors such
0

indifferent

between

This

is

the point where

putting

on

a

tariff

or

the

government

not.

For

is

greater

just
prior

probabilities of a tariff it will definitely put on a tariff, and for lesser
prior proba.bilities it will definitely not put on a tariff.
proposition shows that

;;>

1r*.

The following

That is, the prior probability that makes them

indifferent between putting on a tariff and not with learning is greater than
the prior probability that made them indifferent without learning.

Hence,

with learning, the household has to be initially more skeptical before the
government is induced to put on a tariff in period 1.

Proposition

1:

If O

prior n*such that
Proof:
q

=

If

w1 (~)

<l0 <

1, the prior 1r such

w1 (n*) = Wp(n*)

=WP(n),

w1

1/2, but as mentioned above, when

. 1r
and WP, if

< 1r*,

then

-

WP(n) exceeds the

in the absence of learning.

it is not the case that

When n "' n *, then max (W ,wp)
1

A
w1 (n)
=

1r:

n*, q

~ = i = n*. ~

> 1/2.

> w1 (n *) = Wp(n *) .

w1 > W(n *)

By the monotonicity of

(the common value of

and a zero tariff would be chosen and if

would be chosen in period 1.
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= n only when

n > n*,

then W
p

w1 (n *)

> W(n*)

and WP(n *) )
and a tariff

.
"fr and -fr sueh that
Hence at the pos t eriors
than W(fr*) •
ff

*•

4.

In particular, W (ff)
p

~
Since fr

> W(fr*) ,

w1 <")
fr = WP (-)
n

both are greater

which from monotonicity implies ff

>

- 1t~ > 1r *•
> ff,

Model with Two Consumption Goods

In the model of the previous sections, there was no atemporal distortion
created by tariffs.
household.

The only distortion was in the saving behavior of the

'!his arose because the household was dubious about the motives of

the government and perceived a possible change in trade policy in the next
period.

Extension of the model to include a static distortion in consumption

from the tariff is possible.

In such a case·, the true government will always

choose free trade in the last period.
imposition

in

distortion.·
reduction.

the

first

However,

period can

For positive values of
partially

offset

the

ff,

tariff

intertemporal

it also introduces an additional atemporal welfare

In the one good case, there always exist possible priors for which

choosing the tariff in the first period is superior to free trade (e.g., n
1) ·•

=

When there are two consumption goods, free trade may or may not be a

superior policy for all prior beliefs.
Adding a second consumable to our two-period model is straightforward.
For simplicity, the country is completely specialized in production of the
export good,

which is taken as numeraire.

Output of the exportable is

exogenous and constant, and both the importable and exportable are constnned.
Household utility is again intertemporally separable, and the discotmt rate is
equal to the given world rate of interest.

We write the utility of current

consumption in indirect fonn and assume that units are chosen so that the

13

world relative price of the importable is tm.ity.
Because free trade will always be chosen by the true government in the
second period, social welfare tm.der time-consistent policy is given by:

where 1 is consumption expenditure in period 1 valued at domestic price p 1 ,
1
and z is consumption expenditure in period 2 valued at the world (and true
2

domestic) price, one.
The representative household maximizes expected utility,
beliefs stmJ111arized by n.

given prior

The first-order conditions for maximization yield

=

av ( p, 1 2 >

+

1( - - - - -

812

z 2 = y - (l+r)x, and
12

=y

-

(l+r)x +

and R = (p 2

1 )c

R..z,
2

2

,

in equilibrium.

Planned

consumption of good 2 in period 2 in the event of a tariff in period 2 is
equal to c 2 •
2

The superscript refers to the second good.

1

2

expenditure valued at domestic prices if there were a tariff.

is consumption
The current

accotmt deficit in period 1 is given by x.
We now assume that the utility from current period consumption is
homothetic and displays constant relative risk aversion.
each period is given by:
V(p,l)

=

(v(p)I)l-0'
1-0'

14

Indirect utility in

where v' (p) < 0 and a

> O. Also we define
2
(p-1 )c /I,

=

a

where the superscript 2 refers to the second good, so that expenditures
measured in world prices and measured in domestic prices for the same
constnnption btmdle are related by
z

=

(1-a.)I.

The first-order conditions for household optimization yield:
(10)

1 (i.e., free trade is chosen in period 1) and
( 11)

if p

1

= p (i.e., the tariff is imposed in period

1).

The values of the true government's objective function are:

for free trade in period 1,
and

for the tariff in period 1,
where

'1'

1

= (z2/z 1 )a , in

'Pp= (z /z

2

r

=

1

the presence of free trade,

a
) , in the presence of the tariff,

[(v(p)/(l-a.)v(l)]l--<1, and B

=

1
y(l + (l+r)- ).

15

We have used the fact

that
z

1

= B·

1/a -1
(1 + /3'/>i ) , for i

= 1,p.

It is useful to notice that ( r-1) / ( l-0') is a measure of the atemporal
welfare loss from a tariff since this quantity equals

which is the difference between the utility for

some given

level

of

expenditure measured at world prices when a tariff is in place and when it is
not.

This quantity must be negative.
For many cases, equations ( 10) and ( 11) imply that if n is between zero

and one, then expenditure measured at world prices will be less (greater) in
period 2 than in period 1 when free trade (the tariff) is adopted in pericxi 1.
The

possibility

combinations

of

exists
tariff

that

opposite

the

magnitude,

effects

elasticity

of

occur

for

particular

substitution

between

commodities, and coefficient of relative risk aversion, as long as the latter
is greater than unity.

In such instances, social welfare with the tariff,

Wp ( n).·, is monotonically decreasing in n, so that free trade in period O is
superior to the tariff for all values of n.
attention to cases in which z

1

is greater than z

Therefore, we restrict our
2

if free trade is adopted in

period 1, so that free trade leads to a current account deficit in the first
period, as in the one-good model.
which r(l-a.)

w1 (n)

< 1.

That is, we restrict attention to cases in

This will always hold if a is less than one.

is monotonically decreasing in n and has a derivative equal to

zero for n equal to zero.

However, W ( 1t) has a ma.xi.mum value for some value
p

of n between zero and one.
Because the static distortion is created by tariffs, free trade may be

16

superior to the tariff for all prior beliefs about the government 's type.
If the tariff is superior to free trade for some possible beliefs, then
those values of

for which it is the optimal policy all exceed one-half.

11

This follows from the one-good model, since the presence of the atemporal
welfare effect can only reduce the benefits of tariff imposition.
2(a) and 2(b) display curves
Proposition

_g:

w1 (ff)

Figures

and Wp(n) for two possible cases.

~
The least prior value of n between O and 1 such that W1 (ff)
A

w2 (n), if it exists, under Bayesian learning exceeds the prior

ff*

=

such that

w1 (ff*) = w2 (ff*) in the absence of learning.
Because W (n) is not monotonica lly increasing in n, the argument for
p
A
Proposition 1 is insufficien t. The possibility arises that w1 (n) = Wp(n) for
Proof:

ff and
values of A

-

1r

less than

updating rules imply that

11

*•

n > ;; •

However, if q

>

1/2, t~en the Bayesian

Whenever q ~ 1/2, free trade in the first

period is superior to the tariff for the true government (ff must be less than
Since

< n *,

then n

1

>

n •
2

Any

monotonica lly decreasing.

~

-

w1 (n 1 ) = w2 (ff 2 ) for some n 1 , n- 2
other possibility is ruled out because w1 (n) is

w1 (ff) > Wp(1t) for

1/2).

any

n

< ff*,

if

*
A
n implies that n- must exceed n , and
Therefore, ff>

*

ff)1f)ff.

The two-period model can be extended to an arbitrarily long finite
horizon or an infinite horizon model.

With learning, each period that the

true government chooses its optimal policy, the prior belief that it is the
false type is reduced.

This is true whether the optimal policy is free trade

or tariff imposition in any given period.

If tariff imposition is optimal

given the initial prior, then, in the absence of learning, it will always be
the optimal policy until the last period
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(or always,

if the horizon is

However,

infinite.)

when the household updates

its beliefs about

government's type after observing the policy chosen each period,

the

if the

horizon is long enough free trade will eventually become the optimal policy
choice.

This is true even when the tariff is the best policy in early

The multi-period extension of the model

is

straightforward.

The

household maximizes

T

with respect to consumption expenditures {It}t=O' subject to

L (It/(l+r) t )-s TL ((Rt+ y)/(l+r) t ),

T

t=O
where Rt

= (pt

t
- 1) · c 2 and /3

t=O

= (1-r)-1 •

The expectation is taken with respect

to the sequence of domestic relative prices,

variables for the incredulous household.

T

{pt} t=O'

which are random

The household !mows the objective of

the true government (but assesses less than probability one to the government
being this type), so that it can calculate the pa.th of policies chosen by both
the true type and false type recognizing how its own beliefs will be updated.
At time

T,

the true government's objective is given by

where It is the actual consumption expenditure of the household given the
policies chosen.

The government selects a policy sequence, {pt}i=O' which is

the optimal time consistent one given the updating rules and initial (time 0)
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The horizon T can be infinity.

priors of the private sector.

The Bayesian updating rules are unchanged.

F.ach period that the true

government chooses the policy which is optimal, the prior belief, A, of the
household that it is the true type rises.

For a given initial prior, A ,
0

greater than zero, the number of periods for the prior, At' to decline to any
Therefore, even if the tariff is optimal

value less than unity is finite.

initially, for a large enough T, free trade will become a superior policy in a
bounded number of periods and it will be selected thereafter.

This is

summarized as:
~

Proposition

>

For the infinite horizon problem, if AO

O, the number of

periods such that the tariff is the optimal policy is boilllded by a finite
K will depend upon the parameters of the model.

number K.
Proof

If n

0

= (1-A )q is zero, then the first-best is achieved by the policy
0
00

Let q

sequence, {pt= l}t=o·

> 0,

and denote the value of social welfare under

this policy of free trade as a function of AO' W(A 0 ).
-

00

alternative policy sequence, {pt}t=O' such that 3 t

Furthennore, for any

< ro for which pt= p, the

value of social welfare W(A ) is strictly less than W(A 0 ) for AO= 1. Strict
0
1 2
concavity and twice-continuous differentiability of U(c ,c ) imply that W(A 0 )
Continuity of W therefore implies there exists A*

is continuous in A •
0
such that W(A )
0

> W(:\. 0 )

p and pt = 1, V t

?:

1.

for all AO

> :\. *,

where the policy generating

This implies that given At

> A*,

<

1

W is Po =

at any time t, the

optimal time-consistent policy thereafter is free trade as long as As > A* for
all s

?:

t.

This condition holds by the Bayesian updating rules which imply

that both X and A exceed A 1 , the prior:
sp
s
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,.

The dynamic behavior of the current accmmt can be inferred in the normal
case we consider (that is, an anticipated future tariff induces a current
accmmt deficit) .

If the tariff is a superior policy given initial prior

beliefs, than a current accotmt surplus occurs since there is a perceived
positive probability that free trade will be chosen in a subsequent period.
As the prior probability that the government is the false type falls with

learning, the intertemporal distortion created by the tariff increases and the
current account surplus rises.

Once free trade becomes optimal, the current

accmmt goes into deficit because the private sector perceives a positive
probability of a tariff the next period.

With learning, this probability

declines, sot.hat the current account deficit falls toward zero.

Since the

optimal saving path followed by the economy depends upon the initial prior
beliefs of the household, the steady-state wealth and constnnption also depends
upon the initial priors.

5.

Conclusion

When a government is in power that wishes to maximize the welfare of
consuners, but the consumers do not believe that is the government's goal, a
distortion is introduced into the economy.
the

misperception

is

about

future

In the models we have examined,

tariff

policy.

The

incredulity

of

households creates an intertemporal distortion.
A first-best policy to remove this distortion-~ such as a tax on foreign.
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borrowing

is not available to the government.

As a

second-best policy it

may be desirable to impose a tariff, if the atemporal distortion is smaller

than the intertemporal distortion.
The optimizing government cannot reach the first-best solution under the
constraints we have postulated.

Therefore, even when it implements the best

policy among the ones it has at its disposal, a distortion remains.

However,

we have shown that the mere act of choosing policy optimally over time reduces
This is true even if the optimal policy is to

the size of the externality.
choose a tariff currently.
credibility.

By acting optimally, the government establishes

A government cannot achieve credibility instantaneously -- it

must do so over time by choosing the policy which is best for the public.

The

public will begin to recognize the benificence of the government, even if it
is imposing a tariff, if that tariff is the best choice the government can
make.

(The irony is that the skepticism of the public is what forces the

government to choose a tariff, and is what keeps the economy away from an
unconstrained Pareto optiml.Uil.)
~e presence of learning generally weakens the case for a tariff as a
policy to deal with
incredulity.

the

intertemporal distortion caused by household's

First, the public must initially be more skeptical about the

good intentions of the government (as compared to the case without learning)
for it to be optimal to impose a tariff,

Second, over time with learning it

is inevitable that free trade becomes the best policy.
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